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PLOTINUS AND PARANORMAL PHENOMENA 
Richard T. Wallis, Assistant Professor, Classics, 
University of Oklahoma
October 1973
The present paper, I should make clear at the outset, is intended primarily 
for classicists who are not specialists in Neoplatonism and will therefore 
tell experts in Plotinus little of which they are not already well aware. Its 
purpose is to explain Plotinus' views on a subject which finds itself, perhaps 
surprisingly, once again of some contemporary interest, and where misunderstandings 
and emotionally toned judgments are only too easy. It will be concerned as 
much with the reasons underlying Plotinus' beliefs as with those beliefs them­
selves, and in particular will show how his views on paranormal phenomena 
spring naturally from some of the most fundamental principles of his vrhole 
pin losophy.
It need hardly be said, though it is a consideration more widely observed in 
theory than in practice, that in considering Plotinus or any thinker of the past, 
we must observe two basic principles. First, we should ask his questions and 
not ours; in other words we should not allot him marks for his supposed rationalism 
in terms of some eighteenth or nineteenth century criterion, but rather ask what 
it was reasonable for him to believe in the light of contemporary attitudes and 
of the evidence available to him. Secondly we mu.st consider the whole of what 
he has to say and try to determine the general principles running through it, 
not simply extract a few accessible phrases and hope that they will do instead.
Thus the common statement that Plotinus regards the stars as signs, not as causes, 
is based on a careless reading, out of context, of the opening words of the 
treatise II. 3, On Astrology , and cannot be reconciled with a careful 
study of the whole of that treatise or of Plotinus' other discussions in chapter 5 
and 6 of the early work IN. 1 On Fate and in the concluding section (IV. 4.
30-45) of the great work on The Soul. There are also odd little chapters or 
isolated remarks scattered throughout the F.nneads that present a viewpoint 
apparently more or less at variance with his considered position. As Professor 
Dillon remarked in his paper last year, there is reason to suppose that his 
oral teaching contained even greater oddities^. Thus the chapter II. 9. 14, 
with its attack on the Gnostics' use of incantations and their demonic theory 
of disease, has a somewhat more '’rationalistic" ring than is usual with Plotinus; 
conversely, on a more "superstitious" level there are the chapter IV. 7. 15, 
on oracles from the dead, which so upset Brehier·^ and the references to anthro­
pomorphic daemons that crop up at various points^, ft£ere, since space is limited,
I propose, with one exception, to ignore such passages and to concentrate 
on Plotinus' general attitude.
If then, with this caution in mind, we seek to determine Plotinus' attitude 
to astrology, the paranormal phenomenon to which he devotes most space, we may 
note, first, that he was commonly regarded in antiquity as an opponent of astrology 
and, secondly, that this did not mean then quite what it would now^. For, first, 
total denial of astrological doctrine was normally confined to the most determined 
materialists and sceptics, whose influence by the third century A.D. was 
virtually negligible, and, secondly, the motives of astrology's opponents were 
rarely what we should consider scientific, prompted as they largely were by the 
desire, on the one hand, to preserve human free will and, on the other, to defend 
particular theological views. Thus Christian attacks on astrology were greatly 
influenced by its association with pagan cosmic religion. But if, ignoring this 
question of motive we ask simply what it was reasonable for Plotinus to believe, 
we may observe that astrology, and paranormal phenomena in general, had the
2sanction of most of the greatest scientists of the immediately preceding centuries 
(such as Ptolemy and Galen) and seemed supported by abundant empirical evidence. 
Thus Plotinus refers as matters of general acceptance to the possibility of 
divination^, the influence of the heavens on terrestrial phenomena (III. 1. 5. 
1-15, IV. 4. 31. 8-15) and the remarkable properties of stones and herbs (IV. 4. 
35. 69-70). Perhaps even more important for him, the influence of the heavens, 
especially the sun, on physical phenomena on earth, was supported by Aristotelian 
authority?, and from here it was a natural step to the acceptance of such less 
scientific notions as the moon's supposed connection with kleptomania (cf. III.
1. 2. 4-5); similarly the view that the stars influence man's lower soul and 
the events of his physical life could be derived from the Timaeus (where the 
younger gods were identified with the heavenly bodies) and from the Myth of 
br's account of the Spindle of Necessity (II. 3. 9 and IS). Hence it would 
have been no more reasonable for Plotinus to reject such phenomena than for a 
modern philosopher, with no special scientific training, to reject Evolution 
or Relativity. Any doubts he might have had were likely to be quenched by his 
belief that he had himself on one occasion been the victim of a magical attack 
(V. pi. 10. 1-13). Hence, while certain individual cases might be called into 
question, the reality of such phenomena as a whole seemed beyond reasonable doubt.
This brings us to the most individual feature of Plotinus' own approach, 
its extreme generality. A modern investigator of psychic phenomena will normally 
proceed by first assembling alleged cases of such phenomena, then examining their 
authenticity) finally, if he is bold enough, he may propound a theory to explain 
them. A roughly similar procedure, though using much less rigorous criteria, 
was followed by the Stoics, with their collections of case histories of allegedly 
fulfilled prophecies^, echoed in Cicero's De Divinatione. By contrast Plotinus 
shows no interest in the truth or falsity of such individual cases; instead he 
proclaims his willingness to accept such phenomena as are generally admitted, 
provided they admit a rational explanation^, and proceeds to frame a general 
theory that will explain as many, or as few, of them as subsequently turn out to 
be justified. His procedure in fact has strong resemblances to Hume's attempt 
to frame a single decisive argument to demolish any case of an alleged miracle 
that either has been produced or ever can be. Yet, while Plotinus may be thought 
wise, in the light of our remarks at the end of the last paragraph, to have 
confined himself to general principles, his generality even so goes far beyond 
what would appear necessary. Urns Hume in the second part of his famous essay 
does in fact proceed to apply his principle to some alleged cases of miracles, 
both ancient and modern. Similarly while Sextus Empiricus in his attack on 
astrology (Adv. Math. V) refers to the alleged influence of "Saturn" or "the 
Moon", Plotinus simply refers to the view of "one star as operating by cold 
and another by liquid fire"10. In fact, of course, such extreme generality 
was a characteristic of his mind and exhibits itself in similar form in his 
attacks on contemporary Gnostic and Middle Platonic views, where his concern is 
not at all with the individual authors or systems in question but solely with 
the general principles they represent**; hence the difficulty modern scholars 
have found in identifying his sources and opponents.
Next to the generality of Plotinus' discussion its most striking point is 
perhaps the small number of phenomena he examines. If such isolated references 
as those noted earlier are excluded, his concern is almost entirely with three 
of them, astrology, the object of several discussions already listed, magic and, 
a phenomenon not generally included in this class, petitionary prayer, both the 
latter two being dealt with in the latter part of the treatise On the Soul (IV.
34. 30-45). By contrast there is no more than a brief allusion to "natural 
mantic", the soul's alleged ability to foresee future events in dreams or 
prophetic ecstasy and even less reference to most other phenomena^. The reason 
for Plotinus' concentration on the three phenomena mentioned is, of course, 
their special relevance to his metaphysical and religious concerns, especially 
the two noted earlier. Admittedly Plotinus' conception of free will, like that 
of many other philosophers , is very different from the popular one!3; what is, 
however, of fundamental importance for him is that man's essential self belongs 
to the intelligible order and is therefore free from any determinism imposed 
by the sensible world or the fate governing it. On the theological side there 
was the need to safeguard Plato's basic principles that the gods are never 
responsible for evil (Rep. II. 379-80) and are free from change (ibid. 380-1), 
in particular that they cannot be moved by prayers or sacrifices (Laws X. 905-7). 
These points acquired special importance for Plotinus in the light of the need 
to defend the world-soul and celestial gods against the Gnostics' charge that 
they are evil or that their knowledge, at best, is inferior to that attainable 
by man. These considerations are clearly paramount both in Plotinus' discussions 
of astrology and in his examination of prayer. Thus at the start of the latter 
three problems are set out. First, the fact that many prayers are answered 
only after a long time would seem to imply that the gods have memory, (IV. 4.
30. 14 ff.); but this in Plotinus' view is impossible, first because memory 
constitutes an inferior way of knowledge compared with pure intuitive insight 
and, secondly, because memory of tins world would involve an interest in the 
world on the gods' part similar to that which causes the fall of the human soul^. 
Secondly, and ever, worse, many prayers are for evil things; but gods can give 
only good (ibid. 5 ff.). Finally there is the problem posed by theurgy, the 
attempt to invoke and manipulate divine powers by ritual magic, with its impli­
cation that the gods are subject to human constraint and that "even the whole 
heaven can be bewitched by men's audacity and art" (ibid. 28-30); it was a 
primary concern for Plotinus’ successors, whether their acceptance of theurgy 
was partial (as with Porphyry) or total (as with Iamblichus), to show that their 
views did not involve unacceptable consequences of this kindlS.
Similar concerns are uppermost in Plotinus' critique of astrological doc­
trine, which seems in its contemporary form, to have come under heavy Gnostic 
influence. Armstrong, in his introduction to Π. 3, lists among Plotinus' 
objections, in addition to the charge that they exaggerate the stars' causality, 
the points (1) that they make the stars evil and the cause of evil to men,
(2) that they make them changeable and subject to variations of mood, and (3) 
that they regard them as acting independently and capriciously instead of following 
the rational and orderly direction of Universal Soul*6. With regard to the 
first point Plotinus observes that to conceive the stars as harming beings 
who have never harmed them is to charge them with acting in a manner unworthy 
even of decent men, let alone gods; indeed it is doubtful whether even bad 
men would act in such a way, unless they expected some profit from so doing!7.
As for the idea that the stars derive sexual pleasure from driving human beings 
to adultery, it is simply absurd (Π. 3, 6. 1-4). Equally absurd are the 
anthropomorphic view that the stars change from good to evil according to whether 
they see each other or not, or that such changes depend on whether they are 
rising or setting or pass from day into night; for such terms have meaning only 
in relation to the earth, not for the stars themselves^. Hence both Plotinus' 
general metaphysical views and detailed arguments of this kind require the 
rejection of any such view of the nature of the stars' causality.
4There is, however, another way of conceiving that causality which is no 
less repugnant to Plotinus' basic principles, and that is to conceive it in 
materialist or corporeal .1st terms. Against this Plotinus armies, first, that 
the idea that the stars operate throuph cold or moisture is inconsistent with 
the true view of them as composed of pure fire; secondly, that material 
causation could not in fact produce all the effects the stars are supposed 
to produce. We may indeed suppose that the stars influence man's bodily 
constitution and thereby affect his lower, irrational soul, but the effect 
of such influence would be severely limited and could scarcely produce all 
the variations in character the astrolopers allege. And how in any case could 
they cause lucky or unlucky events, such as noble birth or the discovery of 
a treasure*^? In fact, however, there is no more reason to suppose the 
stars to be causes of all they indicate than are the birds from whose observa- 
tion diviners draw ornens2^, and there are some events which they indicate of 
which they obviously cannot be the cause, namely those, like noble ancestry, 
whose roots lie in the past. (II. 3. 14. 2-4, ill. 1. 5. 41-53.) Similarly 
the Aristotelian principle that the sun and the heavens contribute to the 
birth of living beings also severely limits their influence; the sun does not 
produce a horse, but merely gives something thereto (II. 3. 12). The stars 
are thus only one of many causes, hereditary and environmental, whose relative 
importance is determining a being's nature requires careful investigation2*, 
a view in support of which Plotinus quotes the stock examples of beings born 
at the same time with totally distinct characters and destinies (III. 1. 5. 
5-9). The most important restriction on the stars' causality however, will 
become clear if we examine the world-view in terms of which Plotinus regards 
astrology and other paranormal phenomena as finding their explanation.
The answer, in Plotinus' view, lies in an adaptation to his own system of 
the Stoic doctrine of "cosmic sympathy", the view that the sensible universe 
constitutes "one living creature embracing all living creatures within it, 
and having one soul reaching to all its parts, insofar as each thing is part of 
it" (IV. 4. 32. 4-7). There is thus a network of invisible psychic forces 
linking everything within the cosmos, each of whose parts, like those of 
any other living being, may exercise a sympathetic effect on, or itself react 
in sympathy with, any other part (II. 3. 7, IV. 4. 32). Similarly, just as 
a man's character, or the state of his liver, may be inferred from his eyes, 
so one part of the cosmos, such as the stars, may indicate what is happening 
in another part (IÏ. 3. 7. 4-10). Thus even when the stars are not causes, 
they may be signs, they are like letters for those to read who can22. p0r 
just as other living things develop from a seed according to the natural law 
governing their development, so the universe is governed by a single directing 
principle, the Universal Logos, which is the source of its activities and 
brings them into harmony with one another. Hence the interactions between 
its parts may be compared to the movements of a dancer, whose limbs move in 
perfect co-ordination at each step under the direction of the single rhythm 
governing the whole dance (IV. 4. 33). Thus any accusation that the stars 
act at random falls to the ground, since their actions spring not from their 
individual will, but from their being parts of the universal organisms, and 
hence follow the direction of the Universal Logos (II. 3. 6. 10-20).
Paranormal phenomena in Plotinus' view provide empirical confirmation 
that the doctrine of cosmic sympathy, like those of the unity of all souls 
and the organic nature of the sensible cosmos, on which that doctrine depends, 
is correct2·*. But he is equally emphatic that without it even the ordinary
5phenomena of sense-perception would be impossible (IV. 5 passim). Most 
important is the fact that the doctrine is a necessary consequence of his 
view of reality as a hierarchy of degrees of unity, in which the sensible 
world's organic unity constitutes the best possible imitation, on its own 
level, of the unity-in-diversity of the intelligible cosmos^, lienee on two 
vital points Plotinus transforms the Stoic theory to accord with his own 
metaphysics. First of all the interaction between the world's parts should 
not be conceived, as the Stoics conceived it, in crudely mechanistic or 
corporealist terms^S, What determines the sympathetic reaction between one 
part and another is not, Plotinus maintains, a matter of far and near, but 
of like and unlike; action may take place between two parts separated by vast 
physical distances and without affecting intervening objects in any way 
(II. 4. 32. 13-25). Similarly a medium between the eye and its object is 
necessary only incidentally, to ensure that both form part of the same psycho­
physical world organism: sight depends not on the transmission of an image
through a medium, but on a sympathetic reaction of the object and the organ 
of vision (IV. 5. 2-3). Whether such effects are beneficial or harmful depends 
on whether the nature of the recipient is in harmony with that of the agent; 
hence evil effects are due, not to the stars' deliberate intention, but to the 
individual's inability to receive their gifts in their pure state. Butrin any 
case, since both giver and recipient fall under the direction of the Universal 
Logos, such evil is so only for the part; viewed in the context of the whole 
univex'Se--and here Plotinus agrees completely with the Stoa--there is nothing 
evil or unnatural, though the conditions of the physical world do not always 
permit each of its members to have what it would like^.
The second fundamental point on which Plotinus corrects the Stoics is 
that in his view each individual is subject to the Fate governing the sensible 
world only insofar as he is part of that world. But, as we have seen, the 
higher souls of both men and gods belong to the intelligible order. Hence 
the latter, living wholly by their higher souls^ are at all times totally 
free from the network of forces governing this world, man, on the other hand, 
has to choose whether to live by his true self or to submit to his lower 
being and thereby subject himself to the domination of Fate^·7. It is true 
that his higher soul, in her descent, has joined herself to the harmony 
governing the sensible order and that, even her acts are therefore indicated 
by the stars; this is possible since, deriving as they do from the same in­
telligible source, all souls are ultimately one (ÏV. 3. 8. 1-4, 12. 12-30).
But as long as man remains on that level, the stars ax'e only signs for him, 
and no more. This Plotinus takes as Plato’s meaning in the Timaeus and 
Republic X, and especially of the famous remark in the latter that "virtue 
has no master"™. The consequences of this view for the divine souls will 
become clear if we examine Plotinus‘ treatment of magic and petitionary prayer.
These phenomena Plotinus regards as similarly explicable by the magician's 
learning to apply the same psychical forces as are already naturally operative 
within the physical world. The magician's power, he once again stresses, 
depends on his situation within that world and his ability to adapt himself 
to its forces so as to draw on them. For instance there is a natural magical 
attraction which leads men to fall in love, and love-magic involves simply 
a skillful application of the forces it. involves (IV. 4. 40). Once again, 
however, the power of magic extends only to men's body and lower soul. Hence 
even the sage is not immune to a magical attack on his body or lower soul; 
he may, for instance, fall sick or even face the danger of death, and have to
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resort to counter-spells to repulse the attack*. But his true self remains 
immune, and contemplation, the soul's inner self-concentration, secures his 
essential being against attack; conversely the man whose goal is action in 
the external world has already yielded to that world's beauty and thereby
succumbed to its magical spell (IV. 4. 43-4). It is easy, reading such passages,
to dilute Plotinus' references to "magic" into a mere metaphor. This, however, 
is a mistake parallel to the view, which he rejects, that the stars' power 
over men resides only in their beauty, not in the stars themselves or their
groupings (ibid. 3b. 57ff.). Plotinus recognises the efficacy of the incantations
and gestures used by the magician (ibid. 40. 21 ff.), as also of the stones 
and herbs he employs (ibid. 35. 69-70). Hence the paradox of his position.
It is true that falling victim to magic is in his view no more mysterious 
than falling in love or the emotional appeal of a piece of music (ibid. 40.
24-6) ·, but this is because in his view the sensible world, penetrated as 
it is with magical forces, is already a more mysterious place than the ordinary 
man believes it to be. Hence the man who pursues action for its own sake 
is already a victim of the same forces as a magician would use against him.
The title "paranormal phenomena" is thus misleading; the trouble is that the 
common man admires only what is unfamiliar and fails to see the same powers as 
operative in the everyday things he takes for granted. Similarly, being un­
willing to recognise that "soul" and "life" admit of degrees, he regards 
only beings that visibly live and move as alive. Yet, if he conducted a 
proper philosophical inquiry, he would see that the activities of supposedly 
inanimate things, such as the burning of fire, are inexplicable without the 
power of a sustaining and governing soul (IV. 4. 36. 15 ff., 37. 1 ff.). Here 
is yet another of the dominant themes running through Plotinus' whole philosophy.
On the one hand, here, as elsewhere, he shows himself determined on a rational 
explanation of phenomena; yet this in its turn he regards as possible only 
by totally overthrowing the common-sense view of the world.
Petitionary prayer, for Plotinus, is only one application of magic among 
many. Just as one string may vibrate in harmony with another, so prayer may 
evoke a sympathetic response from the world-soul or the lower soul of one of 
the celestial gods (IV. 4. 41). Hence, if we describe them as "hearing" the 
prayers addressed to them, we should be clear that this involves a mere auto­
matic response on their part without will or awareness (IV. 4. 26. 1-4). Similarly 
there is no reason why prayers should not be answered only after a considerable 
time, without our having to ascribe memory to the gods (ibid. 43. 11-12). The 
stars' attention is wholly concentrated on their higher soul's contemplation of 
the intelligible world, while their lower soul is wholly free from the passions 
that perturb men, since the body they govern is either (in the case of the stars) 
composed of a purer substance than curs or (in the case of the world) all- 
containing and without external wants or dangers, and hence admits of automatic 
control, without deliberate, conscious attention. Hence, if there is any place 
in Plotinus' thought for any form of divine grace, this does not involve change 
or deliberate intent on the gods' part. For both men and gods the only worthy 
object of contemplation is the intelligible world; hence the only prayer worthy 
of the philosopher is the soul's silent concentration upon that order32. This 
is why Plotinus ranks petitionary prayer on such a relatively low level and 
exempts the gods from any conscious concern with it; as Bréhier observes:
"jamais le cuité n' a été plus extérieur, plus réduit à son côté matériel que 
dans sa doctrine"^. On such an explanation it is clearly no more remarkable 
that wicked men's prayers should be answered than that they should draw water 
from streams, or use any other natural force; but since the world is subject
7to divine law, they will subsequently have to pay for their sin (IV. 4. 42.
14-19). What is especially noteworthy is the contrast not just with popular 
religious ideas, but with the Stoics’ continual stress on the deliberate and 
anthropocentric nature of divine benevolence. Thus, whereas they had seen 
divination as one of the most obvious benefits bestowed on man by God,for Plotinus 
the stars are fully occupied with their own business, and the possibility of 
astrological divination is merely a necessary but incidental and unintended 
consequence of their movements^. Similarly that procreation can occur unin­
tentionally and without awareness is for Plotinus a sign that the gods' gifts 
may be similarly unintended (IV. 4. 37. 21-5); Seneca, on the other hand, 
while admitting that we owe gratitude to our parents whether they intended 
to beget us or not, denies emphatically that the gods can have failed to intend 
the good they do us (De Benef, VI. 23). The contrast speaks for itself.
Finally, that theurgy can in Plotinus' system play no part in the soul's 
return to the intelligible order is clear from the fact that its operations, 
like those of any form of magic, must remain confined within the sensible 
cosmos. We have already remarked Plotinus' indignation at the theurgists' 
claim to command the World-soul; but the Gnostics' boast that their spells 
have power even over the intelligible beings arouses even greater resentment 
on his part (II. 9. 14. 1-11). The episodes from Porphyry's biography that 
have sometimes been taken as showing that Plotinus himself practised magic 
have been fully dealt with by Professor Armstrong^ and need no treatment 
here. A careful reading of them will show that, while Plotimis may not have 
disapproved of ritual worship for others, he saw no need to engage in it him­
self; that, while he permits the sage to use magic for the limited practical 
purpose of self-defense, this has nothing to do with theurgy; and, while he 
was on one occasion persuaded to attend an evocation of his guardian daemon 
(which turned out to be a god), the only daemon that really interested him was 
the metaphysical conception of the daemon as an inner psychological principle. 
This, is the subject of the treatise HI. 4, On oxir Guardian Daemon, which 
Porp/lyry claims was inspired by the event in question; if so, Plotinus will 
have astutely seized the occasion to turn his pupils' attention away from 
popular religion towards philosophy.
There is, however, one chapter from the earlier part of tine treatise 
On the Soul (IV. 3. 11), which appears to accord theurgy at least a qualified 
respectability and which, since it has often been overlooked, is worth discus­
sing even in violation of our earlier injunction against giving too much 
weight to isolated paragraphs. Mere Plotinus remarks that "the ancient sages", 
who sought to secure the gods' presence in shrines and statues, considered 
the nature of the universe and realised that Soul would be easy to attract if 
a suitable receptacle were prepared for her (ibid. 1-8). In seeming to tone 
down the passage's theurgic implications, Dodds notes Plotinus' further remark 
that what is needed is a representation suitable "in any way" (ibid. 7 το 
οττωσοΟν μιμηΟευ), which, he claims, "seems to involve denying any specific 
virtue to magical rites of consecration"3i>. But, as we have seen, while Plotinus 
may be taken here as denying that such rites are always necessary, our other 
evidence shows clearly that he did believe in their efficacy. And that special 
rituals and ritual objects were in fact used in the construction of such images 
is clear from our ancient evidence, such as the Hermetic Asclenius' defence 
of the Egyptian image cult (paras. 23-4, 37)-^7. That the cult of magical images 
in fact originated in Egypt is accepted by Dodds himself™, and there is a 
strong resemblance between the reference here to the "ancient sages" and that at 
V. 8. 6. 1 to the "Egyptian wise men".
8Acimittinc then the theurgic reference of the passage, we may see in it a much 
more tolerant attitude, at. least to magic of this kind, than appears in the 
latter part of IV. 4, with its implication that magic constitutes a distraction 
for the philosopher that is at best superfluous for him and at worst a danger.
On the other hand not even in IV. 3. 11 is there any hint that theurgic ritual 
plays any part in the philosopher's ascent and here, as elsewhere, the powers 
invoked by the theurgist do not go beyond the level of soul. Hence in the debate 
as to the value of theurgy Plotinus would here be on the side of Porphyry 
against lamblichus; more precisely, Porphyry, in framing his view of theurgy 
as an easier first step for the average man, took care not to depart from his 
master's metaphysical views39. On the other hand a follower of lamblichus 
could note the implication of the latter part of IV. 3. 11 (8-26) that the 
divine intelligences are indirectly present in their statues through the inter­
mediary of their respective souls in the same way that the solar intelligence 
is indirectly present in the physical sun through the intermediary of its own 
soul, and might wonder whether, if Plotinus had developed this idea, the 
difference between him and lamblichus might turn out to be mainly one of 
emphasis. Yet not merely would the difference of emphasis even so remain 
fundamental; as has been shown elsewhere it rests upon profound metaphysical 
differences between lamblichus and his predecessors regarding the relation of 
the several orders of Reality to one another, and especially regarding the 
status of the human soul. Furthermore a reply to the charge that the theurgists 
claim to subject the gods to human constraint was possible only in the light 
of lamblichus' new stress on the role in theurgy of divine grace, a concept 
present only in embryo, if at all, in Plotinus'^. What IV. 3. 11 does seem to 
show is that Porphyry's advocacy of ritual as an easier way for those unable 
to pursue philosophy directly is far less un-Plotinian than has often been 
supposed, and may perhaps have had Plotinus' tacit approval, or even encouragement. 
If so, not merely would Plotinus have been in no danger of departing from his 
own principles; he would of gone a long way towards removing one of his 
system's greatest weaknesses.
NOTES
o
1 . II. 3. 1. 1-3: *Οτυ η ^ ών άστρων φορα^σημαυνευ περμ έκαστον τά έσομενσ αλλ ' 
ου« αντη παντα κονεε, ως τοΟς πολλοΟ? σοζαζεταμ, εμρηταμ. . .The erroneous 
interpretation is maintained by even a scholar of the calibre of Dodds: cf. 
"Papan and Christian in an Age of Anxiety" p. 15.
2. Cf. e.g. Iamblichus De An. 377. 9ff., discussed on pp. 9-10 of that paner.
3. Cf. p. 188 of his Budd notice to the treatise; for another view cf. Harder’s 
note ad loc.
4. II. 1. 6. 54, III. 5. 6-7, IV. 3. 18. 22-4, IV. 4. 43. 12-16.
5. As in the sixteenth century "with the learned and the studious the question 
was not so much whether astrology was true, but whether all of it were 
true". Sir Charles Sherrington, "Man on his Nature" (Cambridge 1941) p. 59. 
Similarly those who have read e.p. Inge’s praise of Christianity for its 
opposition to astrology ("Philosophy of Plotinus" I. p. 51) may be somewhat 
startled by the amount of astrological lore that Medieval Christians in 
fact accepted, for Plotinus as an opponent of astrology cf. Firmicus 
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